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SALES AND USE TAXES AS AFFECTED
BY FEDERAL GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
MILTON P. RICE* AND R.WAYNE ESTES**

Sales and use taxes, since their advent in the early 1930's as significant state revenue producing measures have, like all other state levies,
found, themselves subject to certain restrictions imposed by the Constitution of the United States. While the constitutional inhibition of
greatest significance for most persons subject to these taxes has
probably been the one posed by the commerce clause, or its first cousin
the due process clause, an obstacle of no mean proportion to the states
has been one not expressly mentioned or even alluded to in the
Federal Constitution,' yet this barrier is as much a part of the organic
law of the nation as is the commerce clause, the due process clause,
or any of our other constitutional components affecting state revenue
systems.
We refer of course, as the title of this article would indicate, to the
doctrine of governmental immunity as enunciated in an early case de2
cided by the United States Supreme Court, McCulloch v. Maryland.
The decision of the Court in that case and the opinion therein by the
renowned Chief Justice Marshall, is so deeply rooted in American
jurisprudence that it can truly be said to constitute a cornerstone of
our constitutional law. Too, it is just as peculiar to the American
political system as any of the specific provisions of the Constitution
and possibly even more noteworthy, since its foundation lies in the
scheme of dual sovereignties evolved by the founding fathers, itself
one of the most extraordinary governmental designs ever contrived
by political artisans.
The Basis Of The Immunity Doctrine
It is quite unnecessary here to recount familiar history in relating
the background of the creation of the Government. It is perhaps
beneficial to observe that it represented a compromise between the
respective views of proponents of a strong centralized federation on
one hand, and advocates of a loose confederation of several sovereign
states on the other. The end product as we know became a constitutional union of separate sovereigns, with paramount but sharply
limited powers in the central government, and all residual powers in
*
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1. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 411 (1938).
2. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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the various state governments. Each was to be supreme within its
own sphere.3 Every point in the United States, save the seat of the
central government, thus became subject to two sovereigns-the
United States and the particular state within which it lay, with the
latter part of, yet independent of, the former.
With the concept of state sovereignty so firmly embedded in the
Constitution, the states themselves so diverse in political background
and culture, and feelings of local autonomy so strong among them, one
might well wonder at the fact that it was more than thirty years after
the formation of the Government that the Supreme Court was called
upon to determine the taxability of one sovereign by another, since
perhaps the prime characteristic of any sovereign has always been
considered the right to tax.
The issue came to a head in simple and direct fashion when the
State of Maryland by legislative enactment levied a tax purporting
to cover all banks or branches of banks not chartered by the Maryland
Legislature, and sought to apply it to the Baltimore branch of a
Philadelphia bank operating under a charter granted by the Congress
of the United States. Maryland's imposition of the tax was challenged
by the contention that a state could not constitutionally tax an instrumentality of the United States, which contention was countered by
the assertion of the state that the denial of its right to tax, that right
being the "highest attribute of sovereignty" would be an invasion of
state sovereignty unwarranted by the Constitution and never intended
by its framers.
Chief Justice Marshall's lengthy opinion struck down the tax as
invalid and enunciated his doctrine that the federal government is by
constitutional implication immune from state taxation. The singular
federal-mindedness of Marshall nowhere appears more clearly than in
the following excerpt from his classic opinion:
"The states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional
laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in
consequence
the general government. This is, we think, the unavoidable
4
of that supremacy which the Constitution has declared."

Had the learned Chief Justice concluded thus without more, we
think it probable that the way might have been left open for a more
orderly and realistic adjustment of federal-state fiscal relations than
proved to be the case following the epochal decision. Regardless of how
3. See Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926); RoTTscHAEFER,
CoNsTITuTIONAL LAw 97 (1939); 51 Am. JuR., Taxation § 218 (1944).

4. McCuloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819). The Court

here was reacting to a threat against the Union. "Marshall's fierce loyalty
to the Union caused him to respond with brilliant logic and eloquent prose. .. ."
Ratchford, Intergovernmental Tax Immunities in the United States, 6 NAT'L
TAx J. 305, 307 (1953).
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offensive the concept of federal immunity may have been to the idea
of state sovereignty in the early days of republic, even in regard to
instrumentalities created by Congress, the necessity for such a conclusion is of course obvious today in the light of logic, orderly government and experience. Probably no responsible person would today
contend that any of the states should enjoy the right to subject the
supreme sovereign, or any of the instrumentalities created by it to
carry out its purposes, to direct state taxation.
Marshall, however, thought it necessary to buttress his conclusion
with the observations that "the power to tax involves the power to
destroy" and that "the power to destroy may defeat and render useless
the power to create." 5 Such comments were probably relevant enough
in the setting which gave rise to them, but subsequent developments
have tended to give them a force and vitality altogether apart from
their context. In the words of Justice Frankfurter of the present
Supreme Court, "this dictum was treated as though it were a constitutional mandate."6 Five years after the decision in McCulloch v.
Maryland, the same Chief Justice Marshall found himself with a second
opportunity to express himself on the identical question.7 The State of
Ohio, in an 1819 Act admittedly aimed at excluding federal banks
from its borders, had levied an annual tax of $50,000 upon each office
of banks transacting business in Ohio other than in compliance with
Ohio laws, authorizing summary means of collection. In defending its
legislative enactment the State of Ohio attempted to draw a distinction
between the officers of a federal bank and government agents of public
institutions such as the mint or post office, likening the connection of
the Government with the bank to its relationship with private contractors, and sought a revision of the doctrine laid down in McCulloch
v. Maryland.
Said Marshall:
"It will not be contended that the directors, or other officers of the bank,
are officers of the government. But it is contended, that, were their
resemblance to contractors more perfect than it is, the right of the state
to control its operations, if those operations be necessary to its character,
as a machine employed by the government, cannot be maintained. Can a
contractor, for supplying a military post with provisions, be restrained
from making purchases within any state, or from transporting the
provisions to the place at which the troops were stationed? or could he be
fined or taxed for so doing? We have not yet heard these questions
answered in the affirmative. It is true, that the property of the contractor
may be taxed, as the property of other citizens; and so may the local
property of the bank. But we do not admit that the act of purchasing, or
of conveying the articles purchased, can be under state control."8
5. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).

6. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 489 (1939) (concurring
opinion).
7. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
8. Id. at 866, 867.
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It is rather evident from this language, again purely dictum, that
Marshall conceded to the states only the right to levy ad valorem taxes
upon the property of private individuals employed in governmental
activity.9 He manifestly conceived that any kind of state taxation
which tended to burden government activity, through whatever means
performed, was an attempt by the states to regulate those activities,
and therefore in derogation of the national sovereignty. Whether
Marshall's attitude would have remained the same had he been able
to visualize the conditions of the present century is a matter upon
which it would be useless to speculate. The fact is, however, that the
strong feelings of the great jurist with respect to federal sovereignty'0
and the reasoning and analogy which he chose to employ in the Maryland and Ohio decisions effectually foreclosed for the next hundred
odd years any chance on the part of the states to secure revenues from
or on account of any transaction to which the government was a party.
A Century Of Rigid Application
Once crystallized in the McCulloch and Osborn decisions by the
fluent absolutism of John Marshall, the doctrine of federal immunity
was applied with inexorable sternness in ensuing years as the prestige
of the national government rose and the concept of federal supremacy
became more fixed in the popular mind. Yet still another trend of
thought came to assume prominence in the judicial approach to state
taxing jurisdiction, one destined to bear with especial heaviness upon
the type of taxes with which we are here concerned. It too was occasioned by an overzealous endeavor of the State of Maryland to obtain
revenue, and it likewise was birthed by the strong-willed Chief Justice
Marshall."
Maryland had undertaken to require importers of foreign articles or
commodities to take out a $50.00 license before being authorized to
sell such goods at wholesale. The taxing statute was challenged as contravening the constitutional provision forbidding states to levy imposts
or duties on imports or exports.
In striking down the tax, Marshall said:
"All must perceive that a tax on the sale of an article, imported only
for sale, is a tax on the article itself . . . a tax on the occupation of an
importer is, in like manner, a tax on the importer. It must add to the
price of the article, and be paid by the consumer, or by the importer
himself, in like manner as a direct duty on the article itself would
be made. This the state has not a right to do, because it is prohibited
by the Constitution."' 2
9. Ibid.
10. Ratchford, supra note 4, at 307.
11. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
12. Id. at 444.
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Thus, between 1819 and 1827-a span of only eight years-three
principles had become a part of our constitutional law with regard to
state taxation, principles which were to form the basis for the complete immunity from state excise taxation enjoyed by the federal government and those with whom it dealt prior to the late 1930's.
First, McCulloch v. Maryland had established the immunity of
federal instrumentalities from state taxation upon their activities.
Second, the dictum in Osborn v. Bank of the United States had declared
to be beyond state taxing jurisdiction sales to government agencies.
And third, Brown v. Maryland had identified sales with the business of
selling to the extent that a tax upon the business of selling was rejected
as bad in cases where a tax upon the vended thing or service itself
would be invalid under the Constitution.
These precepts taken together appeared to add up to the idea that
the states were prohibited from levying in any form a tax, the identifiable economic burden of which would be cast upon the federal government. This became quite clear in the 1842 decision in the case of
Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 3 where the high court condemned an effort by officers of Erie County, Pennsylvania to assess an
income tax upon a resident captain of a United States revenue cutter.
Said the Court: "To allow such a right of taxation to be in the states,
would also be in effect to give the states a revenue out of the revenue
of the United States, to which they are not constitutionally entitled,
either directly or indirectly, neither by their own action, nor by that of
Congress."'14
Perhaps the most startling example of the length to which the immunity concept carried is found in a series of cases involving state
attempts to levy taxes upon telegraph companies. Congress, in the
early days of the telegraph, to encourage the erection of telegraph
lines, had authorized telegraph companies to use United States military
and post road rights of way and the public domain and to cross
navigable streams and waters, in return binding the companies to
accord the Government precedence in the use of their wires for public
business, at rates fixed by the Postmaster General. 5 The transmission
of government messages came to comprise a substantial portion of the
telegraph business. Concurrently, the various states began to look
upon the expanding telegraph companies as sources of revenue.
The State of Texas, having one hundred and twenty-five (125) offices
of the Western Union Telegraph Company within its borders, undertook to levy a tax of one cent (10) upon every full rate message and
one-half of one cent upon each less than full rate message transmitted
by every chartered telegraph company doing business in the state. The
13. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842).
14. Id. at 448.
15. See Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1878).
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Western Union Company resisted collection of the tax both on the
ground that it contravened the commerce clause with respect to
messages sent from points within Texas to points without, and that
as it applied to government messages it was imposed upon an agency
chosen by the Government for the execution of its powers.
The Supreme Court invalidated the tax as being upon operations
beyond the taxing jurisdiction of Texas, sustaining the taxpayer upon
both grounds of asserted invalidity. 16 In so holding the Court predicated its decision upon McCulloch v. MaryZand17 and Brown v.
Maryland.18 Interestingly, and in contrast with some of its later
decisions, it had determined the incidence of the tax by looking entirely
to the measure. Though conceding that Texas had the right to tax
intrastate private business carried on by the company, it regarded the
tax as imposed as being upon the messages sent, rather than the overall doing of business. With respect to the governmental immunity
aspect of the case the Court speaking through Chief Justice Waite
stated: "As to the government messages, it is a tax by the state on the
means employed by the Government of the United States to execute its
constitutional powers and, therefore, void."'19
The zenith of the immunity doctrine probably was reached, however,
thirty years later, in 1912 when the court decided the case of Williams
20 That case involved
v. Talladega.
a municipal ordinance of the
City of Talladega, Alabama which provided that "each person, firm,
or corporation commercially engaged in business sending messages to
and from the City to and from points in the State of Alabama for hire
or reward" should be required to take out a one hundred dollar license.
For operating without having done so, the agent of the Western Union
Company located there was convicted in the Municipal Court and
fined. Defense to the prosecution was made upon the ground that the
license ordinance was imposed upon the entire business done by the
company and made no exception as to the sending of government
messages. The Court agreed with the aefendant and held the ordinance void. In so doing it stated:
'"We have, then, an ordinance which taxes, without exemption, the

privilege of carrying on a business a part of which is that of a governmental agency constituted under a law of the United States and engaged
in an essential part of the public business,-communication between the
officers and departments of the Federal Government. The ordinance,
making no exception of this class of business, necessarily includes its
transaction within the privilege tax levied. This part of the license
exacted necessarily affects the whole, and makes the tax unconstitutional
and void."21
16. Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460 (1882).
17. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
18. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
19. Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460, 466 (1882).
20. 226 U.S. 404 (1912).
21. Id. at 419.
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In truth, the substance of such reasoning may be said to have been,
that the mere touch of the federal government would be sufficient to
import the immunity of the federal government to any taxpayer, unless
the taxing authority in specific terms stated in its taxing statute that
there was no intent to include within its measure any activity connected with or on behalf of the federal sovereign. No great amount of
imagination is necessary to perceive the effect upon state and local
revenues if such thinking prevailed on the present day court.
However sweeping in nature the immunity doctrine may have been
regarded and applied, the test in the early part of the 20th Century
was clear enough-it was an economic one. But even that generalization is not quite sufficient. In the words of Justice Frankfurter in a
comparatively recent case, the doctrine at its peak "assumed that the
economic burden of a tax on any interest derived from a government
imposes a burden on that government so as to involve an interference
by the taxing government with the functioning of the other government."22 And, it may be added, that interest did not necessarily have
to be clearly defined, as is illustrated in the case of Williams v.
Talladega.
Following World War I and the introduction of automobiles in large
numbers, the demand for more and better highways brought into
being a new form of state excise-the gasoline tax. This tax was and
is usually imposed on distributors or other dealers in gasoline at a fixed
rate per gallon stored, sold or otherwise used and is ordinarily deemed
to be upon the privilege of engaging in business.2 The validity of
such a tax as applied to gasoline acquired by federal agencies for
use in their activities was soon called into question.
Mississippi levied such a tax at the rate of four cents per gallon, and
the Panhandle Oil Company contested the right of the state to include
in the tax base gasoline furnished to the Coast Guard and to a
Veterans Hospital located in that state. 24 The court held that to use
the number of gallons sold to the United States as a measure of
the privilege tax was in substance and legal effect to tax the sale,
and "that is to tax the United States-to exact tribute on its transactions and apply the same to the support of the state."''
Though it marked another victory for immunity, the decision in
the Panhandle case was also a noteworthy one for its opponents and
portentous of the changed attitude which was to manifest itself within
a few years. For it drew a ringing dissent from the famous Justice
Holmes, who took the occasion to launch a frontal attack upon John
22. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 576 (1946); accord, Pollack
v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
23. See Foster & Creighton Co. v. Graham, 154 Tenn. 412, 285 S.W. 570 (1926),
for an excellent discussion as to the nature of these taxes.
24. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1928).
25. Id. at 222.
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Marshall's proposition that the power to tax is the power to destroy,
and to proclaim his belief that the high court should permit the
exercise of state taxing power up to the point where it imposed an unreasonable burden upon, or discriminated against, the federal government. Said Holmes, with pithiness rivaling that of Marshall, "the
power to tax is not the power to destroy while this court sits.126
The immunity doctrine was to carry even further, however, before
the tide turned. As late as 1936 the Supreme Court decided the case
of Graves v. Texas Company,27 involving an Alabama statute imposing
a tax upon the "selling, distributing or withdrawing from storage for
any use" of gasoline, insofar as such tax was applicable to gasoline
withdrawn from storage and sold to the Army and the TVA. It was
held that the Panhandlecase controlled, and the tax was held unconstitutional as to such sales. Said Justice Butler, in the majority opinion
from which Justices Brandeis and Cardozo dissented, "Plainly, the sales
and deliveries by the company to the United States necessarily include
storing and withdrawal from storage. A tax upon anything so essential
to the sale of gasoline to the United States is as objectionable as would
be a tax upon the sale itself. The validity of the tax is to be determined
by the practical effect of enforcement."28
The New Concept
With the advent of the 1930's came full realization of new economic
and social patterns evolved by World War I, with resultant enlarged
scope of governmental activities, state, federal and local. Moreover,
there was the great depression, which forced millions of people to
look to their governments for sustenance. Demands for new expenditures by all governments increased as their revenues diminished.
29
To meet the new demands, states began to enact general sales taxes.
This type of levy became increasingly popular, doubtless because of
its ability to produce large amounts of vitally needed revenue at
minimum expense and with minimum loss of time.30 With available
purchasing power, to which the potential yield of a sales tax is so
closely geared, being buttressed heavily by federal expenditures in
the form of work projects, it was not surprising that the hard
pressed states sought to make such projects bear a share of the
burden.
Under most sales tax laws, the contractor on a construction project,
rather than the owner or contractee, is regarded as the consumer
of the building materials and other personalty used, and it is the sale
26. Id. at 223.

27. 298 U.S. 393 (1936).
28. Id. at 401.

29. JACOBY, RETAIL SALES TAxATxoN 75-77 (1938).

30. Id. at 347.
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to the contractor which is taxable. 31 It is he who, as a rule, acquires
the materials to be incorporated into the project, besides providing
the necessary labor to assemble and construct it. He may, depending
on the terms of his contract, receive for his services a lump sum, or
he may be compensated on a "cost-plus" basis, whereby he is paid
the actual cost of the undertaking plus either an agreed percentage
of that cost or a specified fixed fee.3 It was to the contractor therefore that the states looked for any sales taxes accruing with respect to
federal projects, and not to the Government itself, though the amount
of such taxes would undoubtedly be borne ultimately by the Government in the form of increased contract costs.
The question of whether such a burden would be considered to
impinge upon federal immunity was resolved by the Supreme Court
in 1937, in the case of James v. Dravo Contracting Company.33 This
case arose out of an attempt by West Virginia to apply its sales tax
to a contractor engaged in building locks and dams in the Kanawha
and Ohio Rivers on behalf of the federal government. The taxpayer
sought in the federal courts to restrain collection. A closely divided
Supreme Court (5-4), with the majority led by Chief Justice Hughes,
upheld the tax. It should be noted that the Attorney General of the
United States was heard as amicus curiae and argued strongly that
the tax be sustained. Hughes' opinion laid stress upon the fact that
the tax was not laid upon the Government, its property, its officers,
or its contract, but upon the independent contractor, that it was
nondiscriminatory, and that it did not constitute a direct burden upon
the Government. It overruled no prior decision, attempted rather
inartificially to distinguish the decisions in Telegraph Company v.
35
Texas3 4 and Williams v. Talladega,
and dismissed those in Panhandle
Oil Company v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox 36 and Graves v. Texas Company37 as "limited to their particular facts." It found its precedents
in Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchelli a case where federal income tax
upon a state contractor's earnings had been upheld; in Alward v.
Johnson,39 a case where a gross receipts tax levied in lieu of property
taxes had been sustained as against a contract carrier of the mails;
in Fidelity & Deposit Company v. Pennsylvania,40 where a gross
premiums tax upon surety bonds running to the benefit of the United
States had been approved; and in Trinity Farm ConstructionCompany
31. State v. J. Watts Kearney &Sons, 181 La. 554, 160 So. 77 (1934).
32. 1 CCH ALL-STATE SALES TAX REP. 7131 (1955).
33. 302 U.S. 134 (1937).'
34. 105 U.S. 460 (1882).
35. 226 U.S. 404 (1912).
36. 277 U.S. 218 (1928).
37. 298 U.S. 393 (1936).
38. 269 U.S. 514 (1926).
39. 282 U.S. 509 (1931).
40. 240 U.S. 319 (1916).
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v. Grosjean,41 where a state gasoline tax with respect to a federal levee
contractor had been upheld. Hughes likewise apparently placed more
than token reliance upon the fact that the taxpayer was derivatively
asserting a governmental immunity disclaimed by the Government's
own legal officers. The cogent dissent of Justice Roberts2 reasserted
the "burden" test and decried the disregard of precedents.
Close on the heels of the Dravo decision, the Court dealt other
staggering blows to the immunity doctrine. It disallowed immunity
of a state employee's salary from federal income taxation,4 3 overruling
Collector v. Day,44 then rejected a federal employee's claim of immunity from a state income tax,45 expressly overruling New York ex
rel. Rogers v. Graves,46 and overruling Dobbins v. Erie County47 by
implication. The majority opinions in both cases were written by
Justice Stone, and were parallel in the thought that nondiscriminatory
tax burdens, affecting either state or federal governments but incidentally, should not be deemed to restrict the taxing power of
the other by implication of the Constitution. 48
As the depression of the 1930's had limited private sources of state
revenue so did the war which marked the first half of the ensuing
decade. A very large measure of the economic activity of the nation
came to center around the war effort and the hurried expansion
of the military establishment. The work of constructing Army
camps, training centers, ordnance plants, and shipyards was usually
accomplished through private contractors, and in many cases by
the "cost-plus-a-fixed-fee" type of contract.
Such a contract was employed by the Army in the construction of
a camp in Alabama. Alabama's sales tax, imposed upon the seller but
required to be passed on to the purchaser, was sought to be exacted
of furnishers of lumber to contractors for use in construction of the
camp. The contract provided that title to the materials pass to-the
Government upon delivery, and that the Government should make
the decision of whether to buy and retain the right to approve all
purchases in advance, with the contractor to be reimbursed for the
cost. Two cases asserting immunity from the Alabama tax went to the
Supreme Court, one, Alabama v. King & Boozer,49 involving the
sales tax, and the other, Curry v. United States,5 0 involving the use
41. 291 U.S. 466 (1934).

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 161 (1937).
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871).
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
299 U.S. 401 (1937).
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842).

48. For a consideration of the reciprocity of the immunity doctrine on the
federal and state levels, see Rakestraw, The Reciprocal Rule of Governmental
Tax Immunity-A Legal Myth, 11 FED.B.J. 3 (1950).

49. 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
50. 314 U.S. 14 (1941).
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tax. It was held unanimously in both cases, in opinions by Stone,
that under the circumstances the Government was not the purchaser
and the tax did not infringe the Government's immunity. Panhandle
Oil Company v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox51 and Graves v. Texas Company5 2 were overruled to the extent that they held that a tax economically burdening the federal government was invalid.
In these cases, counsel for the United States, which had advocated
53
the limiting of immunity in the Dravo case, took an opposite view.
Having rejected Chief Justice Marshall's formula of absolutism
and embraced various tests of "degree" and "burdens," the Court
now found itself, as the Chief Justice had warned, faced with "perplexing inquiry so unfit for the judicial department, what degree
of taxation is the legitimate use, and what degree may amount to
54
the abuse of the power."
The Court in the King & Boozer case recognized the immunity
doctrine but was explicit in stating that federal sovereignty "does
not spell immunity from paying the added costs, attributable to the
taxation of those who furnish supplies to the Government and who
have been granted no tax immunity. '55 The Alabama sales tax and
its ultimate burden on the United States was upheld as "but the
normal incident of the organization within the same territory of two
independent taxing sovereignties." 56 Former tests of "economic
burden," 57 already weakened by the Dravo case, were held no longer
tenable58 by the Court. In the Curry case the Court emphasized that
"the Constitution, without implementation by Congressional legislation, does not prohibit a tax upon Government contractors because its
burden is passed on economically by the terms of the contract or otherwise as a part of the construction cost to the Government." 59
In place of "the economic burden" test, specifically rejected, the
Court espoused the test of "legal incidence." By this test, if the
incidence of a state tax is directly upon the United States, or one of
its instrumentalities, it is violative of the federal government's implied
51. 277 U.S. 218 (1928).

52. 298 U.S. 393 (1936).
53. "In recent decades the philosophic foundations of the immunity of the
government have received practical content from the view that the Government should not be saddled with the economic cost of state taxation .... While

unsatisfactory as a criterion of validity . . . the economic aspect of intergovernmental tax immunity has lent solidity to a rule otherwise wholly conceptual in nature." Brief for the United States, pp. 53-54, Alabama v. King &
Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
54. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 430 (1819).
55. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 9 (1941).
56. Id. at 8.
57. Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393 (1936); Indian Motorcycle Co. v.
United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931); Graysburg Oil Co. v. Texas, 278 U.S. 587
(1929); Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218 (1928).
58. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 9 (1941).
59. Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14, 18 (1941).
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immunity; if the Government is affected by the state tax only through
the increased cost of services or materials, the tax is valid.
After a long line of subjective formulae, the Court had alighted
upon a test emphasizing form. The application of the state taxing
power to the United States now depends upon whether the United
60
States is hit rather than whether it is economically hurt.
Two subsequent cases not squarely in point with the King & Boozer
case present an interesting demonstration of the Court's employment
of the "legal incidence" test. The first of these cases, United States v.
Allegheny County,61 was decided in 1944 when a county real property
tax was levied on the Mesta Machine Company which had leased
machinery from the United States. The property assessed included
the leased machinery, and the United States by contract was required
to reimburse the company for such taxes. The Court held that the
tests established by the Dravo and King & Boozer cases were not
applicable and the tax was invalid since "the Government's property
'62
interests are not taxable either to it or to its bailee.
In 1953 in the case of Esso Standard Oil Company v. Evans, 63 the
Court was faced with the question of the liability of Esso Standard
to a Tennessee tax upon the privilege of storing gasoline owned by the
United States, a tax measured by the number of gallons stored. The
Court held that the privilege tax was not "on" the government-owned
gasoline and therefore the Allegheny County decision was not controlling and the tax was valid. These two cases saw the Court
meticulously applying the "legal incidence" test in determining the
validity of state taxes affecting the United States. 64
Following the King & Boozer case, federal immunity appeared to
be laid to rest insofar as it posed a barrier to state sales taxation of
private contractors with the federal government. Indeed it was, so
far as the Supreme Court was concerned, for the next thirteen years.
States which had general sales, gross receipts or gross income taxes
lined their coffers during the war years and thereafter with money
65
derived from war contractors.
The Contemporary Picture
In considering the liability of federal contractors or other private
persons with whom the Government may deal to any form of state
60. See Powell, The Remnant of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 5&
HARV.

L. REv. 757, 787 (1945).

61. 322 U.S. 174 (1944).

62. Id. at 187.
63. 345 U.S. 495 (1953); see Sanders, Constitutional Law-1953 Tennessee
Survey, 6 VAxD.L. REV. 1159, 1164-66 (1953).
64. For other instances in which state taxes were upon property in which
the federal government had an interest, see the cases collected in 4 VAND. L.
REv.195 (1951).

65. Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58
L. REV. 633, 653 (1945).
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taxation, it is to be borne in mind that Congress may grant specific
immunity to federal agencies and private parties with whom they may
contract where no implied immunity would exist.68 Numerous cases
have recognized this principle. The most recent example of its application is found in state tax cases involving the Atomic Energy
Commission.
When the Atomic Energy Act became law in 1946, there was included in section 9 (b) thereof the following provision:
"The Commission, and the property, activities, and income of the Commission, are hereby expressly exempted from taxation in any manner
or form by any state, county, municipality, or any subdivision thereof."67
The Atomic Energy Commission, with extensive installations in
several states, notably Tennessee and Washington, operated in large
degree through private contractors in the construction of atomic
facilities and the production of fissionable materials. Vast amounts of
materials were required for the various projects, which materials
the numerous contractors obtained from many sources, local and
out-of-state, and for which they were reimbursed by the Commission.6 8
When the State of Tennessee undertook to subject these purchases to
its new sales and use tax in 1947, the contractors and their suppliers
resisted payment on two grounds-first, that the contractors were
agents of the United States Government and protected from the tax
by the implied constitutional immunity doctrine, and second, that
the Commission and its contractors were immunized by section 9 (b)
of the Atomic Energy Act. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held
that the contractors were not governmental agents, but that the
quoted language of section 9 (b) did serve to confer immunity upon
them.69 In the appeal to the Supreme Court, the latter tribunal was
thus required to determine only the effect of section 9 (b). Tennessee
contended that the statutory language was but affirmative of the
undisputed constitutional immunity of the Commission itself, no
mention of private contractors being made in the purported exemption, and that the states were entitled to have such exemptions stated
in clear and unambiguous language where they were intended to extend to private persons. The Court held that the word "activities"
in section 9(b), used in reference to the Commission, was broad
enough to include the purchases made by the Commission's contractors,
66. Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21 (1939).

See also

Thomson v. Pacific R.R., 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 579, 588-89 (1869); James v.
Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 160, 161 (1937).
67. 60 STAT. 765 (1946), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1809(b) (1952).
68. For a discussion of the pertinent history' of AEC operations, see Carbide
& Carbon Chemical Corp. v. Carson, 192 Tenn. 150, 155-59, 239 S.W.2d 27, 2931 (1951).
69. Carbide & Carbon Chemical Corp. v. Carson, supra note 68.
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hence the statute amounted to a congressional immunization of the
contractors.7 0
This decision, possibly because it deprived several states of sizable
amounts of revenue, or possibly because they viewed it as representing a tendency on the part of the Court to constrict the permissable
boundaries of state taxation of government contractors, created such
a furore among the states that Congress repealed the portion of
section 9 (b) held by the Court to exempt the AEC contractors. 71
The rapidity with which this exemption was removed from the
statute books is probably indicative of the temper of Congress with
regard to statutory immunization generally of private persons dealing
with the Government. Previous efforts in this direction had with
but few exceptions fallen by the wayside-a fact upon which counsel
for the State of Tennessee placed considerable reliance in arguing
against the presence of any congressional intent to exempt AEC
contractors in the Atomic Energy Act. The fact that so many of the
states presently have sales taxes and similar excises to which practically all business done by private persons are subject will quite
likely serve to prevent their elected representatives in Congress from
viewing with favor any future attempt to immunize those contracting
with the Government. The growing federal tax consciousness of the
nation, however, coupled with the omnipresent pressure upon the
federal government for expanded domestic outlay and the stark
necessity for maintaining a large and effective military arm, could
conceivably cause the national lawmakers to take a second look at the
policy which permits the states to add their levies to the federal
fiscal burden.
February of 1954 found the Supreme Court with a definite and
concrete criterion for determining the validity of state sales taxation
of federal contractors. However, by the eighth day of that month
the Court had handed down its decision in the case of Kern-Limerick,
Inc. v. Scurlock,7 2 a pronouncement which almost immediately occasioned a wave of apprehension among the states lest the state victories in the Dravo and King & Boozer cases might prove to be swept
away.73 With certain very important exceptions, the facts of the
Kern-Limerick case were not unlike those in the King & Boozer case.
A private contractor was under contract to construct a naval ammunition dump in Arkansas and procured two tractors from Kern-Limerick,
Inc., for use in the construction. The United States agreed to
reimburse any state taxes paid by the contractor. Arkansas levied

70. Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952), 22 TENN. L. REV.
437, 32 B.U.L. REV. 241.
71. 67 STAT. 575 (1953).
72. 347 U.S. 110 (1954).
73. See Atkins, Federal Operations and Potential Effects on the State Tax
Base, PRoc. NATL Ass'N TAx ADmi's 25 (22d Ann. Conf. 1954).
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its two per cent sales tax on the vendor to the contractors, who, with
the United States intervening, sued to recover the taxes paid.
The all important difference in the fact situation of the KernLimerick case is found in the form of the contract. By its terms, the
contractor became a "purchasing agent" for the United States and
title to materials and equipment purchased passed directly from the
vendor to the United States which was directly liable to the vendor
for the price, although the contractor was to advance the payments
and be reimbursed. 4 The contract was entered into by the Department
of the Navy pursuant to sections 2 (c) (10) and 4(b) of the Armed
75
Services Procurement Act of 1947.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the tax on the grounds
that the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 did not authorize
the Navy Department to constitute an independent contractor as a
purchasing agent for the United States, and the contract arrangement was designed to avoid lawful taxation. 76 Therefore the contractor was liable for the tax under the phrasing of the state statute,
which read "sales of service and tangible personal property including materials, supplies and equipment made to contractors who use
the same in the performance of any contract are hereby declared to
be sales to consumers or users and not sales for resale."7 7 The tax was
required to be passed on to the purchaser.78 Reversing the Arkansas
court, the Supreme Court held that the sale had been made through
a purchasing agent to the United States which of course was constitutionally immune.79 It also held that the Procurement Act afforded
broad powers to the armed forces for obtaining supplies and services,
and that the contracting of agents to handle such purchases was within
these powers. 80 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court and

not the supreme court of the state, as the King & Boozer opinion
seemed to say,8 1 has the final right to construe state tax statutes to
82
decide the incidence of state taxes.
The real import of the case is that the Supreme Court will recognize
"contract agency" under at least questionable 83 congressional authority
in applying the legal incidence test of tax immunity. The Court
emphasized its recognition of contract form in this manner: "But
since purchases by independent contractors of supplies for government construction or other activities do not have federal immunity
74. 347 U.S. at 112 n.2.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

62 STAT. 21 (1948), 41 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1952).
Parker v. Kern-Limerick, Inc., 221 Ark. 439, 254 S.W.2d 454 (1953).
ARx. STAT. ANN. § 84-1903 (e) (1947).
Id. § 84-1908.
Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954).
Id. at 116.
314 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941).
Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 121-22 (1954).

83. Id. at 123 (dissenting opinion).
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from taxation, the form of contracts, when governmental immunity
is not waived by Congress, may determine the effect of state taxation
on federal agencies, for decisions consistently prohibit taxes levied
84
on the property or purchases of the Government itself."
The contract in the Kern-Limerick case embodied substantial changes
from the business arrangement in the King & Boozer case, where title
to the materials passed to the United States upon delivery at the site
of work or storage, where the contractors were to purchase in their
own name and on their own credit, and where the United States was
not bound by the purchases. In the Kern-Limerick case, title passed
directly from the vendor to the United States, and the contractors did
not purchase in their own name but rather pledged the credit of the
United States to the vendor.
In some ways the 1954 decision represented a logical corollary to the
King & Boozer decision which emphasized form, rather than substance, in the legal incidence test. In the Kern-Limerick case, the
states felt the sharp edge of the legal incidence test, honed sharp to
protect their finances, when the Court turned it against them by recognizing contract form in deciding the incidence of state taxes. The
resorting of the Government to the scheme utilized in the KernLimerick contract to avoid state taxation is not surprising. Indeed,
the very language of the King & Boozer opinion seemed to suggest it, 85
and such action was predicted soon after that case was decided in
1941.86

Just what effect does this most recent decision have on the concept of immunity as evolved by the Supreme Court in the late thirties
and early forties? Has the Court, as Justice Black's dissent states,
effectually overruled the King & Boozer case, thereby moving "back
in the direction of discredited tax immunities"? 7 Justice Douglas
dissents that "the substance of the transaction and the nature of the
economic burden on the United States" of the two cases cannot be
distinguished.88 This is true, but since the King & Boozer decision,
neither substance nor economic burden can be said to be the determining factor, but, rather form and legal incidence are decisive.
It would appear that the Kern-Limerick case has not overruled the
King & Boozer holding, but that it is the logical result of the doctrine
announced in the earlier case if the Court takes cognizance of the
Kern-Limerick contract procedure.
64. Id. at 122-23.
85. The Court pointed out
of agents of the Government
314 U.S. at 11.
86. Note, 28 VA. L. REv. 251,
87. Kern-Limerick, Inc. v.
opinion).

that the contractors did not have "the status
to enter into contracts or to pledge its credit."
263 (1942).
Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 124 (1954)

88. Id. at 126 (dissenting opinion).

(dissenting
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Most significant perhaps is that the King & Boozer opinion stated
that the final determination of who was a "purchaser" within the
meaning of a state taxing statute was a matter of state law upon
which only the highest court of the affected state could speak with
finality. 89 The Court in the Kern-Limerick decision held that this
statement of the prior case is not to be taken "literally" since it refers
only to who is responsible under the law of the state to pay the tax
and did not refer to the incidence of state taxes. Although the Court's
distinguishing of the King & Boozer holding in this regard is rather
unconvincing, the result reached-the Court's right to determine facts
or constructions affecting federal constitutional issues-is not without
precedent. 90
If any aspect of the Kern-Limerick case affords cause for alarm to
state taxing authorities it is the apparent attitude the present Supreme
Court has manifested in its opinion. The holding therein concededly
assumed "that the contract was designed to avoid the necessity in
this cost-plus contract of the ultimate payment of a state tax by the
United States." 91 Thus, the Court countenances the drafting of government contracts with the design of avoiding otherwise valid state taxes,
and appears as a direct invitation for other branches of the federal
government to employ such contracts to conserve their funds at
the expense of the fiscs of state governments. 92
The Court's broad interpretation of the Armed Services Procurement Act leaves contracting officers free to follow "business practices" and delegate to private persons the power to buy goods for
the Government and to pledge its credit. The dissenters term the
majority interpretation as a "tremendous break with long established
93
buying practices."
The attitude of the Court both in broadly interpreting the Procurement Act and in being unfazed by the Government's use of contract
form and colorable agency to avoid state taxes otherwise due would
appear to furnish considerable basis for apprehension on the part
of the states. This is especially true in view of the fact that that
portion of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act
of 194994 dealing with government contracts is almost identical in
wording with the Armed Services ProCurement Act.
89. 314 U.S. at 9-10.
90. "Where a federal right is concerned we are not bound by the characterization given to a state tax by state courts or legislatures, or relieved by it
from the duty of considering the real nature of the tax and its effect upon the
federal right asserted." Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367-68 (1930);
accord, United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
91. Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 116 (1954).
92. "Under the instant decision it seems that government agencies can
easily attain immunity from taxes levied on their purchases through careful
wording of their contracts." 68 HARv. L. REv. 121, 123 (1954).
93. Kern-Kimerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 124 (1954) (dissenting
opinion).
94. 63 STAT. 393 (1949), 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 251-55 (1952).
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It would appear that, thdugh the Court outwardly observed the
legal incidence test, the impact of state taxation on government programs has led it to apply once again a test recognizing "economic
burden" via a broad interpretation of the Procurement Act and upholding the use of obvious tax avoidance measures by the Government.95
Likewise, the Kern-Limerick attitude recalls for purposes of comparison that exhibited in the Roane-Anderson opinion three years
previous. Taken together, these two recent expressions by the Court
may well be taken to indicate that, while there is no inclination on
the supreme bench to overrule or modify the doctrine that states may
tax independent federal contractors without infringing federal immunity, the Court will construe liberally in favor of the Government
any congressional action tending either to confer immunity upon
such persons or make it available to them at the Government's option.
FutureProspectsForImmunity
Any study of the question herein dealt with must readily concede
that there are many facets to the problem of whether and to what
extent the states should be permitted to levy taxes the burden of
which fall upon the federal treasury. Legal determinations in this
regard are, have been and probably must be undergirded in large
measure by national policy and the degree to which the national
government assumes a role in the economic life of the nation. The
expressions of the Court upon the subject from McCulloch v. Maryland
to the present day have been symptomatic of changing attitudes and
conditions. John Marshall in the McCulloch and Osborn opinions
was striving vigorously to protect a federal sovereignty which at that
time had yet to win either acceptance at home or respect abroad.
On the other hand Justice Stone, in Alabama v. King & Boozer, was
probably endeavoring to conserve, if not state sovereignty as such,
at least the ability of the states to pay their way in a political climate
which had relegated to the federal sovereign the lion's share of the
revenue potential of the nation.
In the present era the merits and demerits of immunity are still
asserted with vigor as between federal and state officials. Federal
functionaries, beset with the rigors of straitened budgets and taxpayer
demands for maximum results from each tax dollar spent, are understandably unhappy at having to pay over indirectly to the states out
of government funds even the proportionately small amounts occasioned by state consumption taxes. That immunity would relieve
the federal government in the aggregate of substantial additional costs
95. See 34 B.U.L. REV. 224 (1954).
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cannot be gainsaid. 96 Another argument for immunity is that it would
effectuate taxing parity as between the various states insofar as
revenues derived on account of federal projects are concerned. The
absence of immunity may occasion some states to grant it to federal
contractors as an inducement to the Government to locate economically desirable federal activities in those states when actually it may
be more advantageous from other standpoints to place them elsewhere. Still another reason advanced is that the absence of immunity
requires the use of cumbersome procurement procedures to avoid
state taxation. This is exemplified by the practice prevalent in some
government agencies of acquiring themselves the materials scheduled
to be used in a construction project, taking title to themselves, then
turning them over to a private contractor for use in fulfilment of
the contract. The agency of course is exempt from any sales or use
tax with respect to the property, though the contractor is not exempt
unless the state taxing statute makes him so.
The federal arguments are controverted by contentions made on
behalf of the states which are more numerous and, in the opinion of
the writers, more compelling.
If it is conceded that absence of immunity deprives the federal government of the full effective use of its money, by the same token it
must be admitted that immunity of persons dealing with the federal
government would deprive the states of revenue which they not only
need but can hardly afford to relinquish. Under the existing tax
structure, the most productive fields of revenue have long since been
preempted by the national government. Most states are compelled to
look to excise taxes for their sustenance. One of the most consistent
productive taxes in this field has proved to be the sales tax and it
is upon this levy that many states97 depend usually for the financing
of state undertakings such as education and welfare programs. Granting of immunity to government contractors would remove from
the base of this tax a substantial and significant portion thereof,
with a proportionate decrease in the over-all tax yield, and a resulting necessity either of curtailing the dependent state enterprises or
of looking elsewhere for compensating revenue. And it should be
noted that tax resistance is no less pronounced on the state level
than it is on the federal. Indeed it is probably more so. Another argument vigorously enunciated by the states is that the immunity doctrine
96. 'The government [in its brief in the King & Boozer case] estimated
that a denial of immunity in that case would subject it to a liability of
$33,946,177 for 1941 purchases, and $54,000,000 for purchases made in 1942, in
fulfilling 548 'cost-plus' contracts having a gross value of $6,720,929,777." Note,
Constitutionaland Legislative Bases of IntergovernmentalTax Immunities, 51
YALE L.J. 482, 483 n.8 (1942).
97. At this writing 33 states, the District of Columbia and numerous large
cities levy general sales taxes, occupation taxes, gross receipts taxes or gross
income taxes.
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insofar as it applies secondarily to those dealing with the Government,
is inimical to state sovereignty in that it clothes private persons with
an attribute of sovereignty in a manner never intended by the
founding fathers of the Republic. If a private person can be given
this attribute of sovereignty there is no logical reason why he can
not succeed to others.
Also advanced by the states is the fact that the numerous federal
installations which have grown up in the past twenty-five years, and
particularly during and since World War II, have had a decided
impact upon the states and the services which the states are called
upon to render. When such projects are located in a state, usually
on comparatively short notice, they bring in a great influx of people,
which in turn occasions a necessity for new schools and highways,
besides increased demand for other services. Some of this demand for
new expenditures can be offset by the increased revenue derived from
consumption taxes, if those who deal with the Government are not
immunized against those taxes.
Again, immunity would serve to maintain inequality of taxing
jurisdiction as between the states and the federal government. The
federal government looks very largely to personal and corporate
income taxes for its revenues. The compensation of state employees
and state contractors is not immune from these taxes and probably
will never be. State income taxes, where they exist, are nothing
comparable to the federal levies, and many states do not have them
at all. It can probably be said safely that their existence creates a
very inconsequential burden upon the federal treasury. Unless the
states are permitted to apply their excise taxes to those dealing with
the Government, state taxing jurisdiction will obviously be grossly
98
out of proportion to federal.
As any state tax administrator will readily testify, exemptions or
exclusions from tax bases constitute his most consistent harassing
problems. In any sales or similar type tax the state looks to the
vendor for payment. Where the tax base is broad enough to include
all or substantially all of the business done by vendors, administration by tax officials, and bookkeeping by the vendor, is at its simplest.
When exemptions or exclusions are introduced, however, complications are occasioned, with more records having to be maintained and
more time having to be consumed in the tax computation, not to
mention the affording of increased opportunity for tax evasion and
the concealment of taxable transactions by the vendor. Likewise,
the v-endor is never without responsibility to verify exemptions
claimed by those who do business with him. Private persons making
purchases with the benefit of governmental immunity usually have
98. See Atkins, supra note 73, at 26.
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the opportunity if they care to exercise it, and in the absence of
stringent safeguards, to stock-pile materials for their own private use
under the immunity of a government exemption certificate. These
facts in all earnestness must be said to militate against the concept
of immunity and can no more be ignored by the conscientious federal
official than can the substantial costs of state taxation to the federal
government be overlooked by state officials.
Whatever the view may be as to the merits or demerits of immunity,
for the present its limits are fairly well circumscribed by the legal
incidence test. The states can and do tax those from whom the
Government may buy or with whom it may contract, in the absence
of circumstances making out an agency such as existed in the KernLimerick case, or congressional action which can be construed as
conferring immunity upon such private persons. Of course, the
boundaries of legal incidence may in the future be moved in either
direction, either as a result of judicial change of attitude or by virtue
of legislative enactment.
As for alteration of the Supreme Court's approach to constitutional
immunity, consideration of such here must be conceded to be purely
in the realm of speculation. Changes in personnel on the court could
very well be reflected in its future expressions. Since Kern-Limerick,
Justice Jackson has died and has been succeeded by Justice Harlan.
Other members of the Court are at or past retirement age,99 indicating
the probability of more new faces on the Bench in the not too distant
future, and possible differing points of view and new approaches to
constitutional questions.
One aspect of immunity yet to be considered is the liability of a
private contractor for state taxation with respect to the use of property,
title to which is vested in the Government prior to use. The Government not infrequently, as was the case in the King & Boozer contract, 0" reserves the right to furnish its contractor with the
materials necessary for the construction of a project. In recent years,
possibly for tax avoidance or possibly for other reasons, there has
been a tendency on the part of government officials to exercise this
right with the result that the contractor has nothing to do with the
acquisition of the materials from a private supplier or their importation into the state where they are to be used. Since 1954,
several states, apparently to counteract the effect of the Kern-Limerick
decision, have amended their sales tax statutes so as to place on
contractors liability for tax with respect to personality used in the
performance of contracts, irrespective of the identity of the title holder
99. As of December, 1955, Justice Frankfurter is 73, Justice Burton 72,
Justice Reed 71, Justice Black 69, Justice Minton 65 and Chief Justice Warren
64. Retirement age is 70.
100. 314 U.S. at 13.
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of such property, or of any immunity which might be enjoyed by
such title holder.10' The high court will doubtless have occasion to
pass upon the validity of such provisions as applied to contractors
assembling and otherwise making use of government-owned property
in connection with the performance of government contracts.
While such alteration in the form and wording of state sales tax
statutes might afford relief from the possible consequences of the
Kern-Limerick decision, it is unlikely to prove a lasting or satisfactory
remedy. Even if the Supreme Court should recognize such state
laws at the present, there is no guarantee that it will continue to
do so. It must be emphasized that where a federal right is concerned,
the Court reserves for itself the right to determine the incidence of
state taxes'0 2 affecting the United States, and could look through the
veil of form and wording any time it so chose.
This observation brings us to the alternative method of possible
alteration of the immunity situation, which is direct action by Congress
defining its boundaries. It is not doubted that Congress has the
power to legislate upon the problem in any direction it chooses.
It can extend immunity to all private persons doing business with
the Government to the extent that the Government may be affected
by the imposition of state taxes upon such persons, or it may deny
immunity to any government agency or instrumentality presently
enjoying it either under the Constitution or by statute.103 Or it can
by statute provide for payments directly to state and local governments
in lieu of taxes'04 which might be collected in the absence of government installations or operations or the constitutional immunity enjoyed by them.
Recent history would indicate perhaps a greater likelihood of legislative action denying immunity to all save congressionally created
agencies of the Government itself. Already there has been introduced
in Congress a bill proclaiming as its purpose the prohibiting of "the
United States from entering into contracts under which private contractors are constituted agents of the United States to purchase property necessary to carry out such contracts."'105 In addition the House
Ways & Means Committee presently is considering a proposal relative
to the situation made by the National Association of Tax Administrators.
Substantially the same groups interested in such legislation were
101. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE AxN. § 6384 (Deering Supp. 1955); GA. CODE
ANx. § 92-3448(a) (Cum. Supp. 1955); S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-1361.1 (Cum. Supp.
1955); Tenn. Pub. Acts 1955, c. 242, §§ 6, 8.

102. Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 121-22 (1954).
103. See Austin v. The Aldermen, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 694, 699 (1868); James v.

Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 148 (1937).
104. 48 STAT. 66 (1933), as amended, 54 STAT. 626 (1940), 16 U.S.C.A. § 831(1)

(1941).

105. S.2100, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
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responsible for the congressional action which amended the Atomic
Energy Act and placed contractors for the Atomic Energy Commission
on a par with other federal contractors in regard to state taxation.
It is to be recalled too that in the 75th, 76th and 77th Congresses,
which sat in the late 30's and early 40's, unsuccessful efforts were made
to exempt government contractors from state taxation,106 and that
in 1940 Congress enacted the Buck Act which made state taxes applicable to income derived from activities in, and transactions taking
place on, areas over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction.10 7 Thus Congress has shown itself to be not unsympathetic to
state efforts to make economic activity incident to federal projects
pay its way.
With this in mind, the indicated course of action would appear to
be clear enough for the states. Congress, the fountainhead of national
policy, should be made acutely aware of the importance of sales
and use taxation to the states, the general effect of federal governmental immunity upon the revenue potential of this type of taxation,
and the possible consequences to flow from legally sanctioned avoidance of such taxes when the Government's conceded immunity from
state taxation is conferred contractually by executive agencies of
the Government upon private persons. Favorable reaction by Congress
to the states' position could very well result in legislation putting to
rest any present day doubts as to the national policy respecting state
taxation which affects the federal purse. On the other hand, a
contrary expression by Congress would tend to indicate that body's
approval of administrative practices calculated to relieve the federal
fisc of state tax burdens. In either event, the states could proceed
to fashion their revenue policies in more certain knowledge of
the extent to which the federal government's immunity will operate
to restrict them.
106. See Atkins, supra note 73, at 27.
107. 4 U.S.C.A. §§ 105-09 (Cum. Supp. 1955).

